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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things is expected to be dominated by a huge number of inter-
actions between billions of persons and heterogeneous communications among
hosts, smart objects and among smart objects themselves. It provides a variety
of data that can be aggregated, fused, processed, analyzed and mined in order
to extract useful information [6]. Unquestionably, the main strength of the IoT
vision is the high impact on several aspects of every-day life and behavior of
potential users. However, many challenging issues prevent the vision of IoT to
become a reality, such as interoperability, navigability, trust, privacy and secu-
rity management and resource discovery in such heterogeneous and decentralized
network. To resolve some of the cited issues, a new paradigm called Social Inter-
net of Things (SIoT) is born.
Integrating social networking concepts into the Internet of Things has led to
the Social Internet of Things paradigm, enabling people and connected devices
to interact with oﬀering a variety of attractive applications. SIoT appeared as
a result of an evolutionary process that aﬀected modern communication by the
advent of IoT in telecommunication scenarios [3]. The ﬁrst step of this process
consists in making objects smart. The next step consists in the evolution of
objects with a degree of smartness to pseudo-social objects [3] which can interact
with the surrounding environment and perform a pseudo-social behavior with
other objects. The last step consists of the appearance of social objects includes
being able to autonomously establish relationships with other objects, to join
communities and build their own social networks whose can diﬀer from their
owner’s ones [3]. Adopting such vision is, therefore, a promising new trend, with
numerous advantages. First, navigability and resources discovery are improved
by narrowing down their scopes to a manageable social network of everything
[2]. Second, the scalability is guaranteed like in the human social networks [4].
Third, the heterogeneity of devices, networks and communication protocols is
resolved by the use of social networks [2]. And a larger data source becomes
available as it comes from a set of users. The continuous feeding of data from
communities gives us big data [10]. Quantity and variety of contextual data
have increased allowing improved services intelligence and adaptability to users’
situational needs [2].
However, the SIoT paradigm does not allow to ﬁx trust, security and privacy
issues. Furthermore, the numerous advantages of SIoT such as improving nav-
igability, and increasing quantity and variety of contextual data, make privacy
and security of IoT users more compromised.
In the literature, trust mechanisms have been widely studied in various ﬁelds.
Several works in the literature have dealed with this problem. They have pro-
posed diﬀerent trust-models, based on diﬀerent features and measures, aiming to
rank the best nodes in the SIoT network. Regarding the existing related works,
our contribution in this paper are summarized as follow:
1. Unlike most existing reputation and trust management schemes in the litera-
ture, our goal is to detect malicious nodes. This allows us to isolate (or block)
the malicious nodes, limit the interactions made with them, and obtain a
trustworthy system (network). Classifying trustworthy nodes would not pre-
vent malicious ones from performing their malicious behaviors that could
break the basic functionality of the given system.
2. To achieve the goals of ensuring a reliable and trustworthy system, we ﬁrst
present an informal description of each kind of trust-related attack. Then, we
propose a new trust model based on new features derived from the description
of each type of trust-related attack. Works in the literature use more global
features such as the centrality of the node or the number of friends in common
between two nodes. These features have no relation (from a semantic point
of view) with the mentioned trust-related attacks.
3. To combine the proposed features, the majority of related works use the
weighted mean. However, the performed behaviors for each type of trust
attack are diﬀerent. A weighted mean cannot detect all types of attacks since
the features considered and the weights assigned to each feature may diﬀer
from one type of attack to another. We propose new features in our work and
a new way to combine them using machine learning techniques, in order, to
classify nodes into benevolent nodes and malicious nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present back-
ground about main concepts. In Sect. 3, we analyze and compare related works.
In Sect. 4, We give a formal presentation of the proposed trust evaluation model.
In Sect. 5, we detail the design of the proposed features. In Sect. 6, we detail the
proposed classiﬁcation function which allows to aggregate proposed feature in
order to distinguish malicious behavior from benign ones. In Sect. 7, we present
evaluations that enabled us to validate the resilience our trust evaluation model.
Finally, we conclude in Sect. 8 with providing future insights.
2 Background
The Social Internet of Things paradigm allows people and objects to interact
within a social framework to support a new kind of social navigation. The struc-
ture of the SIoT network can be shaped as required to facilitate the navigabil-
ity, perform objects and services discovery, and guarantee the scalability like in
human social networks. However, trust must be ensured for leveraging the degree
of interaction among things.
Trust is a complicated concept used in various contexts and inﬂuenced by
many measurable and non-measurable properties such as conﬁdence, belief, and
expectation on the reliability, integrity, security, dependability, ability, and other
characters of an entity [20]. There is no deﬁnitive consensus about the trust con-
cept in the scientiﬁc literature. Indeed, although its importance is widely recog-
nized, the multiple approaches towards trust deﬁnition do not lend themselves
to the establishment of metrics and evaluation methodologies.
Trust can be deﬁned as a belief of a trustor in a trustee that the trustee will
provide or accomplish a trust goal as trustor’s expectation. In SIoT environment,
trustors and trustees can be humans, devices, systems, applications, and services.
Measurement of trust can be absolute (e.g., probability) or relative (e.g., level
of trust). The trust goal is in a broad understanding. It could be an action that
the trustee is going to perform; it could also be an information that the trustee
provides.
Trust management mechanisms and trust evaluation models are proposed to
ensure trust in diﬀerent types of systems. Their roles consist of providing (com-
puting) a trust score, which will help nodes to take decision about invoking or
not, services provided by other nodes. There are several varieties of attacks that
are designed to speciﬁcally break this functionality. We present in this section
the main trust-related attacks cited in the literature [1,5,7]. We also explain the
diﬀerences between trust management mechanisms and trust evaluation models.
2.1 Trust Attacks in SIOT Networks
An attack is a malicious behavior established by a malicious node launched to
break the basic functionality of a given system and to achieve a variety of mali-
cious ends. A malicious node, in general, can perform communication protocol
attacks to disrupt network operations. We assume such attack is handled by
intrusion detection techniques [9,16] and is not addressed in our work.
In the context of SIoT, we are concerned about trust-related attacks that can
disrupt the trust system. In this kind of attacks, a malicious node could boost its
own reputation to gain access to higher functions or generally be disruptive in a
manner that brings down the overall eﬃciency of the system. Thus, a malicious
IoT device (because its owner is malicious) can perform the following trust-
related attacks. We assume that there are some others attacks which can be
autonomously launched by devices. We will consider them in future works. In
this paper, we focus on attacks performed by IoT devices under the control of
them malicious owners.
– Self Promoting attacks (SPA): is an attack where malicious nodes, pro-
vide bad-quality service, try to boost their reputation (by giving good rates
for themselves) in order to be selected as service providers.
– Bad Mouthing Attacks (BMA): is an attack where malicious nodes try
to destroy the reputation of well-behaved nodes (by giving them bad rates)
in order to decrease their chance to be selected as service providers.
– Ballot Stuﬃng Attacks (BSA): is an attack where malicious nodes try
to promote the reputation of other malicious nodes in order to increase their
chance to be selected as service providers.
– Discriminatory Attacks (DA): is an attack where malicious nodes attack
discriminatory other nodes, without a strong social relationship with them,
because of human propensity towards strangers.
In Table 1, we propose an informal speciﬁcation of the malicious behavior for
each type of trust-related attack.
Table 1. An informal description of malicious behavior for each type of trust attacks.
Invoker (ui) Provider (uj) Interactions I(ui, uj)
BMA Malicious node:
- Provides poor quality ser-
vices
- Provides bad votes that do
not reﬂect his actual opinion
to destroy the reputation
of uj
Benign node:
- Has a good reputa-
tion
- Provides good
quality services
- A lot of interaction
- The majority of votes
provided by ui to uj are
negative
BSA Malicious node:
- It has a good reputation
- It gives high scores that do
not reﬂect his actual opinion
in uj in order to promote his
reputation
Malicious node:
- Provides good quality
services
- Has a bad reputation
in the network
- A lot of interaction
- The majority of votes
provided by ui to uj are
positive
SPA Malicious node:
- Provides services of poor
quality
- Has a bad reputation in the
network
- Provides high ratings that
do not reﬂect his opinion to
uj in order to promote
reputation
Malicious node:
- Provides poor
quality services
- A lot of interaction
- The majority of votes pro-
vided by ui to uj are positive
- ui and uj are often nearby
- They have same interests
- They provide same services
DA Malicious node:
- Provides bad votes to the
majority of other users
Malicious/benign
node
The majority of votes
provided by ui to uj are
negative
2.2 Trust Evaluation and Trust Management
Some researchers have focused on developing trust management mechanisms
dealing with trust establishment, composition, aggregation, propagation, storage
and update processes [11]. However, we focus in this work on the main step which
is the trust establishment step. We will focus on the other steps in future works.
The trust establishment step consists of developing a trust evaluation model and
represents the main component of trust management mechanisms. Indeed, the
performance of the trust management system essentially depends on the model
introduced to evaluate the degree of trust that can be granted to the various
entities involved in the system. We consider that a trust evaluation model is
mainly composed of two steps, namely (i) the composition step and (ii) the
aggregation step. The other steps such as propagation, updating, and storage
will provide other properties such as system response time and scalability.
(i) The Composition Step consists of choosing features to be considered in
calculating trust values. Several features have been considered in the literature
such as honesty, cooperativeness, proﬁle’s similarity of proﬁles, reputation,...
These features can be categorized into various dimensions: (i) global or local;
(ii) implicit or explicit; or (iii) related to users, devices or provided services. To
measure these diﬀerent features, the authors use information related to nodes,
such as their position, their interaction history, their centrality in the network.
(ii) The Aggregation Step consists of choosing a method to aggregate
values of diﬀerent features in order to obtain the ﬁnal trust value. For this
purpose, authors in the literature use static weighted mean, dynamic weighted
mean, fuzzy logic, probabilistic models, and so on.
3 Related Works
Various trust-models are proposed in the literature in order to ensure trustworthy
services and interactions in SIoT environments. In this section, we try to analyze
and compare these diﬀerent models based on two criteria: (i) the proposed trust
evaluation model; and (ii) the resilience face trust-attacks.
Trust evaluation models are composed of two steps, namely (i) The com-
position step and (ii) The trust aggregation step. For the trust composi-
tion step, authors propose diﬀerent features such as recommendation, reliabil-
ity, experience, and cooperativeness. Those features represent abstract concepts
aiming to quantify the nodes trust level and are computed by diﬀerent measures
depending on authors goal and background. For example, in [14], the recommen-
dation feature is measured as the number of nodes directly connected to a given
node ui. However, in [17], the recommendation feature is measured as the total
mean of rates given to a node ui. This same measure (mean of rates) is called
reputation in some other works. The cooperativeness feature is considered as an
indicator to measure a node’s knowledge in [17] and is computed as the level of
the social interactions between two nodes. However, in [7] the cooperativeness
feature is computed as the number of common friends between two nodes.
Given that there is no consensus about trust concept deﬁnition, and given
the divergence of the proposed features, as well as the divergence of the measure
of each feature, this can give birth to thousands of trust evaluation models with
diﬀerent combinations between the features calculated with diﬀerent measures.
We believe that a trust evaluation model must above all fulﬁll the role of guar-
anteeing the reliability of the system in which it is involved. This reliability is
compromised by the diﬀerent types of trust-related attacks.
We have chosen in this work to start from the deﬁnition of each type of
attack. We present an informal description of each attack that we formalized
using mathematical measures and equations. We believe that some features and
measures proposed in the literature, such as the number of friends in common
or the number of relationships in the network, have no relation to the cited trust
attacks. Moreover, as it is common in the classic social networks, a malicious
node could try to increase the number of its relations in general or the number
of its common relations with a given node, before proceeding to attacks. Some
other measures, such as the mean rates, could give an idea about the history of a
node’s interactions and could, therefore, permit to detect some types of attacks.
The features proposed in the literature remain insuﬃcient to detect the diﬀerent
types of attacks. Indeed, none of the proposed features can detect, for example,
the SPA attack in which a node is hidden under a false identity.
To conclude, the performance of a trust evaluation model mainly depends
on the features and measures chosen in the composition phase. Nevertheless,
it also depends on the method chosen in the aggregation phase. The weighted
mean is most used aggregation method. However, the performed behaviors for
each type of trust-related attack are not similar. A weighted mean cannot detect
all types of attacks since the features considered and the weights assigned to
each feature may diﬀer from one type of attack to another. The problem of
detecting malicious nodes being considered as a complex problem and requiring
an in-depth analysis of nodes behaviors, and thus, we propose the use of machine
learning techniques.
The second criterion of comparison concerns the resilience to trust-related
attacks. Some of the cited works focus on trust-attack detection. However, they
do not prove the ability of the proposed model to detect trust-attack through
evaluations or experimentation. The majority of related works propose model
permitting to assign a trust degree to each node in the network. Their goal
is to rank nodes according to their trust-values. However, this kind of model
does not allow to detect malicious attacks and malicious nodes. This gives the
malicious nodes free access to establish diﬀerent types of attacks in the network.
The purpose of our work is to detect malicious nodes in order to block them and
obtain a trustworthy system (Table 2).
Table 2. Comparison of related-works
[18] [13] [17] [7] [15] [8]
Trust
evaluation
model˜
Trust
composition
Knowledge
reputation
experience
Consistency
intention
ability
Recommend
reputation
experience
Honesty
coopertiveness
community-
interest
Reliability
reputation
Reputation,
social
relationship,
energy-level
Trust
agregation
Fuzzy logic Weighted
mean
Fuzzy logic Combinatorial
logic
Weighted
mean
Weighted
mean
Goal Node ranking    
Attack-
detection
 
4 System Modeling
4.1 Notations
Let Gtu = (U, S) be a directed graph representing users social network at time
t. U is the node set U = {ui|0 < i ≤ n} where n is the number of users. S
is the edges set and reﬂects the friendship relation between users. Each user
ui ∈ U , can be modeled by the 5-tuple 〈id, age, city, country, devices〉 where
devices represents the list of devices that belong to the user ui.
Let Gtd = (D,R) be a directed graph representing devices network at time
t. D is the node set D = {dj |0 < j ≤ m} where m is the number of devices. R
is the edges set where R ∈ {or; sr, wr, lr, pr} represents the diﬀerent kinds of
relations which can occur between devices. or represents the owner relationship
which occurs between two devices having the same owner. sr represents the
social relationship which occurs between two devices when their owners have
a social relationship. lr represents the relation between two devices which are
in proximity. wr represents the relation between two devices which interact to
perform a common task. pr represents the relation between two devices which
belong to the same category.
Each device dj ∈ D, can be modeled by the 5-tuple <id, category, longitude,
latitude, services> where services represent the list of services provided by the
device dj . Each service sk is modeled by the 4-tuple <id, endpoint, domain, qos>
where qos (Quality of Service) represents the service’s non-functional character-
istics such as its availability, response time, latency, and reliability.
4.2 Problem Deﬁnition and Formalization
With the presented notations and deﬁnitions, our main problem is to detect
malicious users. In a formal way, given a training set of N instances of users
associated with a class label li ∈ {malicious, bening}, the problem is turned ﬁrst
to design an advanced set of M features extracted from the training set. Then,
the features designed are used to learn or build a binary classiﬁcation model y
using a given training set such that it takes features X as an input and predicts
the class label of a user as an output, deﬁned as y : ui →{malicious, bening}.
5 Features Design
In this section, we present the composition step of our trust evaluation model. We
propose new features permitting to describe and quantify the diﬀerent behaviors
operating in SIoT systems. Our features are derived from the informal descrip-
tion of each type of trust-related attack and allow to distinguish malicious behav-
ior from benign ones.
5.1 Reputation
This feature represents the global reputation of a user ui in the overall network
and is denoted as Rep(ui). It is computed as the quotient between the number
of positive interactions and the total number of interactions (Eq. 1). Positive
interactions are interactions with a high rate value. Nodes with a high reputation
value are more likely to be attacked by other nodes. Nodes with a low reputation
value are more likely to perform trust attacks. The reputation feature, combined
with other features, can help in revealing BMA, BSA, SPA and DA attacks.
Rep(ui) =
∑
sk∈S(ui),(rt(uj ,sk)>=3) m
|I(ui, uj)| (1)
where rt(uj , sk) is the rate given by the user ui to the service sk and I(ui, uj)
the set of interactions occurred between ui and uj .
5.2 Honesty
Honesty represents whether a user is honest and is denoted as Hon(ui). A user is
considered honest if his rates reﬂect his real opinion, which means that he doesn’t
try to give wrong rating values to enhance or decrease other users reputation.
Indeed, in BMA, BSA and SPA attacks, the malicious node presents a dishonest
behavior. In the BMA attack, the malicious node gives bad votes to a node that
provides good quality services, in order to ruin its reputation. In the BSA attack,
the malicious node gives good votes to another malicious node that provides poor
quality services, with the aim of helping it to promote its reputation. In the SPA
attack, the malicious node tries to promote its own reputation by giving itself
good votes while its services have poor quality.
The Honesty feature is, therefore, a key feature, which associated with other
features, may reveal diﬀerent types of attacks. To measure and quantify this
feature, we compare the user rating vector Rvec(ui) with the rating matrix
using Cosine Similarity Measure (Eq. 2).
Hon(ui) =
∑
xj∈Rvec(ui),x′j∈Mvec
√
(xj − x′j)2 (2)
Where xj is the rate of ith user on jth item, x′j the average of rates given by all
network nodes on item j, Rvec(ui) is the rating vector of the ith node and Mvec
is the mean rating vector representing the average of the rating matrix
5.3 Quality of Provider
Quality of provider represents whether services provided by the user ui present
a good or bad QoS. It is denoted as QoP (ui). Indeed, malicious node aims at
propagating services with bad quality. Services with good quality naturally reach
a good reputation in the network. The malicious node must resort to malicious
behavior to propagate bad services and will, therefore, perform BMA, BSA,
SPA and DA attacks to achieve this goal. QoP feature is therefore essential to
distinguish the nodes that likely perform malicious behaviors from other nodes
that provide good quality services and do not need to carry out attacks to
propagate them.
QoP (ui) =
∑
dj∈D(ui),sk∈S(dj)) QoD(dj) ∗ QoS(sk)∑
dj∈D(ui) QoD(dj)
(3)
where Sui is the set of services provided by the i
th node, qos(sk) is the QoS
value of the service sk, and α is a threshold.
5.4 Similarity
Similarity refers to the similarity between user ui and user uj and it is denoted as
sU(ui, uj). This feature is computed based on diﬀerent features such as proﬁles,
interests, provided services, used devices and the frequency of proximity between
a couple of users. It aims to detect aﬃnity between users but can also reveal
Self-Promoting Attack (SPA) in which the same user tries to promote his own
reputation under a false identity.
5.5 Rating-Frequency
Rating-Frequency refers to the frequency of rating attributed by a user ui to a
user uj , denoted as RateF (ui, uj). It is computed as the number of rates given
by a user ui to a user uj divided by the total number of rates given by the user
ui. Indeed, if a user ui performs an attack against a user uj , we will probably ﬁnd
a high number of rates given by user ui to user uj . According to whether these
rates are positives or negatives and according to some other features such as the
reputation and the QoP of the target user uj , we can detect a Ballot-Stuﬃng
Attack or a Bad-Mouthing Attack.
5.6 Direct-Experience
Direct-Experience refers to the opinion of a node i about its past interactions
with a node j, denoted as dExp(ui, uj). It is computed as the quotient of suc-
cessful interactions between node ui and node uj , divided by the total number
of interactions between them. The direct experience feature can not therefore
directly reveal an attack. But, combined with other features, it helps to distin-
guish what kind of attack it is. Indeed, taking the example of two nodes ui and
uj where ui is a node that provides bad services and therefore has a low QoP
value. The Rating frequency value RateF (ui, uj) shows that the node ui is striv-
ing to give rates to the uj node. Indeed, ui gives a total of 10 votes, of which 6
are attributed to uj . In this case, it is probably an attack. Other features, such
as uj ’s reputation and QoP, as well as ui’s honesty, may conﬁrm this hypothesis.
The direct experience feature can ﬁnally decide whether it is a BMA or BSA
attack. Indeed, in the BMA attack, node ui aims to ruin the reputation of uj and
will, therefore, provide negative rates which result a low value of dExp(ui, uj).
Whereas, in the BSA attack, the node ui aims to promote the reputation of uj ,
which result a high value of dExp(ui, uj).
5.7 Rating Trend
The rating trend feature is measured by the number of positive votes divided by
the total number of votes provided by a user. It aims to reveal if a user is rather
optimistic or pessimistic. It permit to detect the discriminatory attack (DA) in
which the user provides negative votes randomly.
6 Classiﬁcation Function Design
Once we have chosen the features that describe the behavior of diﬀerent nodes in
the network, the next step consists in choosing a method to aggregate the values
of the diﬀerent features, in order to obtain the ﬁnal trust value. In the literature,
the most common method is the weighted mean. However, we estimate that the
performance of the system depends in this case mainly on weights assigned to
each feature. Furthermore, the performed behaviors for each type of trust-related
attack are diﬀerent. A weighted mean cannot detect all types of attacks since
the features considered and the weights assigned to each feature may diﬀer from
one type of attack to another.
The problem of the detection of malicious nodes being considered as a com-
plex problem and requiring an in-depth analysis of nodes behaviors, we propose
to use machine learning techniques. To our knowledge, this technique has never
been used to measure trust. We consider our system as a classiﬁcation problem.
Indeed, our objective is to detect if a user is malicious or benign. A user is con-
sidered malicious if he tries to perform BMA, BSA, SPA or DA attack. If the
user didn’t perform any of the cited attacks, he is considered as benign. So, for
each users ui, we have two possible classes, namely (i) malicious user class, (ii)
benign user class.
Machine learning techniques allowed us to avoid the problem of ﬁxing weights
and thresholds. Indeed, the machine learning algorithm will take as input the
proposed features, will automatically assign the weights based on the learning
data-base and will return as output one of the mentioned classes. The model as
proposed in this work does not allow to determine the type of performed attack,
but only to detect whether there was an attack or not. We plan in our future
work to improve the proposed model, since some attacks may be more dangerous
than others depending on the context and the domain. It would be interesting,
in this case, to be able to know the type of attack.
7 Results and Evaluations
7.1 Experimental Setup
Data-Set Description. Due to the unavailability of real data, the majority of
related works oﬀer experiments based on simulations. In our work, we evaluated
the performance of our model based on experiments applied to an enriched real
dataset. Sigcomm1 data-set contains users, their proﬁles, their list of interests. It
contains also social relations between users, interactions occurred between them
and frequency of proximity of each couple of users. We generate for each user
one or more devices and we divide interactions of a user by his devices. Figure 1
shows statistics and description of the resulting data-set.
Performance Metrics. To assess the eﬀectiveness and robustness of our pro-
posed features using machine learning algorithms, we adopt the accuracy and
the standard existing information retrieval metrics of precision, recall, and f-
measure.
1 http://crawdad.org/thlab/sigcomm2009/20120715/.
Fig. 1. Data-set description
Learning Methods. We used the diﬀerent learning algorithms implemented
in WEKA [12] tool, to build the binary classiﬁcation function y. We report here
the results of Naive Bayes, Multi-Layer Perceptron and Random Tree learning
algorithms (see Fig. 2). We ﬁnally opt for the Multi-Layer Perceptron because it
has shown the best results in terms of the evaluation metrics. We used 10-fold
cross-validation algorithm to evaluate the performance of our features.
Fig. 2. Comparison of machine learning algorithms
Experiments Procedure. In this work, we propose a trust evaluation model.
For this, we proposed, ﬁrst, new features and measures to describe the behavior
of diﬀerent users. Secondly, we propose to use a new method of aggregation
based on machine learning, able to diﬀerentiate malicious users from legitimate
users.
To prove the performance of each proposed feature, we ﬁrst measure the
information gain for each feature separately. Then, we compare the features
that we propose with the most used features in the literature based on common
evaluation measures such as recall, precision, and F-measurement. For this, we
use the most used aggregation method in the literature which is the weighted
mean.
To prove the performance of the proposed aggregation method (Machine
Learning), we compare (i) the results obtained by the other works with the
weighted mean, (ii) our characteristics with the weighted mean and (iii) our char-
acteristics with Machine Learning. Finally, to prove the resilience of the proposed
trust evaluation model, we measure the proportion of malicious nodes detected
on diﬀerent networks with diﬀerent percentages of malicious nodes ranging from
10 to 50%.
7.2 Experimental Results
Single Features Performance. The Fig. 3 shows the information gain when
using one single feature in the learning process. The similarity feature has the
largest value of information gain. This can be explained by the fact that this is
the only feature able to detect Self Promoting Attacks (SPA). Rating frequency,
quality of provider, rating trend, honesty and reputation features present almost
equal information gain values. Indeed, they are equally discriminative for the
detection of BMA, BSA and DA attacks type. The direct experience attribute
has the lowest information gain value. This attribute does not actually detect
attacks. But, it allows, as explained previously, to make the diﬀerence between
a BMA and a BSA attack.
Fig. 3. Evaluation of single features performance
Group Features Performance. We compare our 7 features with 10 features
existing in the literature. We implemented the 10 features with experimenting
them on our data-set to have fare comparison. Since related-works that propose
these features use the weighted mean for the aggregation step, we had to try
diﬀerent weights for each feature used in each related-work. We selected the
weights that gave the best results for each work (see Table 3).
In addition, many of the proposed trust evaluation models have objectives of
classifying nodes according to their trust degrees, without detecting malicious
nodes. So, we had to set the thresholds below which a node is considered as mali-
cious. We have similarly tried diﬀerent threshold values for each of the related-
works and we have chosen the thresholds that give the best results for each
model. Table 3 shows the weight and threshold values we have ﬁnally selected
for each related-work.
Table 3. Parameters for group feature performance evaluation
Related works Features Weights Thresholds
Jayasinghe, U., et al. 2016
[14]
Recommendation
Reputation
0,62
0,38
0,30
Truong, N.B., et al. 2018 [19] Reputation,
Experience
0,84
0,16
0,22
Chen, R., et al. 2016 [7] Honesty
Coopertiveness
Community-Interest
0,74
0,12
0,14
0,22
Militano, L., et al. 2016 [15] Reliability
Reputation
0,37
0,63
0,35
Our features with weighted
mean
Honesty
Reputation
Similarity
Direct Experience
Rating frequency
Quality of Provider
Rating trend
0,18
0,19
0,1
0,06
0,19
0,18
0,1
0,58
We then used the weighted mean for the features we propose in this work.
This allowed us to compare and validate the relevance of the features we pro-
pose compared to those of the state of the art. Finally, we applied the machine
learning on the features that we propose in this work. This allowed us to prove
the relevance of the aggregation method that we propose (the machine learn-
ing) compared to the most used method in the literature (the weighted mean).
Figure 4 shows the results obtained. The features we propose give better results
in terms of recall, precision, and f-measurement compared to other works even
in the case of aggregation with a weighted mean. The results are even better
when we applied the machine learning technique for the aggregation step.
System Resilience. Figure 5 presents the proportions of malicious nodes being
detected obtained for an increasing number of malicious nodes performing ran-
domly all kinds of trust-related attack. The proportion remains high (89%) even
Fig. 4. Comparison with related works
for a system when 50% of the nodes are malicious. Those evaluations prove that
our system can ensure resiliency toward each kind of trust-related attack, even
facing a high percentage of malicious nodes. We have not continued the assess-
ments for higher percentages, for the simple reason that, if a system has more
than 50% malicious nodes, then it is a defective system.
Fig. 5. Proportion of malicious nodes being detected
8 Conclusion and Future Directions
Social Internet of Things (SIoT) is a paradigm where the Internet of Things
(IoT) is fused with Social Networks, oﬀering a variety of attractive services
and applications. However, facing this emerging paradigm, people feel wary and
cautious. They worry divulgence of their data and violation of their privacy.
In this work, we propose a new trust-evaluation model, able to detect mali-
cious nodes, in order to obtain a reliable and resilient system. Our future
prospects are to develop a trust-management mechanism based on the proposed
trust-evaluation model. This mechanism must ensure not only trust establish-
ment but also the propagation, storage, and updating of trust. This will raise
new issues related to the speciﬁc characteristics of SIoT environments, such as
the scalability, dynamism and constrained capabilities of IoT devices.
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